And are you ready for the plot twist? We think the judge is actually doing the right thing. But it will take a moment to explain why. Yep, you are spoiled, folks because you are going to get another trademarked Aaron Walker Legal Deep Dive®. So, strap in, this is going to be a long one.
So, let’s start with the basics. As you surely know, Luigi Mangione has been charged in the murder—really, an assassination—of Brian Thompson, the CEO of United Healthcare. He has been charged under New York State law. But New York has chosen to abolish the death penalty, so true justice cannot be obtained under state law. Of course, Mangione is innocent until proven guilty but if it is proven that he committed the crime, then it is hard to argue that the price for such a cold-blooded assassination should be anything but death. Therefore, Federal Prosecutors have also charged him and they were seeking the death penalty. And yesterday we learned that Judge Margaret Garnett had dismissed two charges, so that now the most severe punishment he might face is life in prison without parole (we abolished the federal parole system a while back). As the judge explained:
This case will proceed to trial on Counts One and Two, which charge the Defendant with causing Brian Thompson’s death under two federal stalking laws. The potential maximum punishment for each of those offenses is life in prison without parole. Count Three is a capital-eligible offense, on which the Government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Consequently, the chief practical effect of the legal infirmities of Counts Three and Four, and this Court’s decision that they must be dismissed, is solely to foreclose the death penalty as an available punishment to be considered by the jury that will otherwise determine, at trial, whether to convict the Defendant for causing Brian Thompson’s death.
We saw more than a few people denouncing the decision as another example of crazy activism from a leftist judge appointed by the Autopen Administration Biden Administration, such as these posts:
This is judge who threw out the murder charge that would have allowed Luigi Mangione to face the death penalty.
— Josiah Lippincott (@jlippincott_) January 30, 2026
Checks out. pic.twitter.com/fHxGCsUpQd
What the judge in the Luigi Mangione case just did here is insane.
— Theo Wold (@RealTheoWold) January 30, 2026
Judge Margaret Garnett-- a Biden appointee-- dismissed the murder charge that would have made him eligible for the death penalty because, according to her, stalking does not count as a crime of violence. https://t.co/gbyGqFVX8b pic.twitter.com/sOcOyicIZ3
Are you paying attention yet?
— Jack Posobiec (@JackPosobiec) January 30, 2026
BREAKING: Luigi Mangione no longer faces death penalty after Biden judge dismisses two chargeshttps://t.co/Z2yYZzmSjr
You can read the opinion for yourself here …
Right now reading the opinion in the Luigi Mangione case which took the death penalty off the table. You can, too, here: https://t.co/eyfWu0DpJP
— (((Aaron Walker))) (@AaronWorthing) January 31, 2026
Do you guys see what I see?
… but, honestly, when we started to analyze the opinion, we assumed that the narrative was correct: Crazy, soft-on-crime judge appointed by Rip Van Biden finding any excuse to protect Mangione—possibly secretly sympathizing with his cause. So, we were just skimming the decision until we ran across this passage: ‘However, regardless of its own views, a district court is duty-bound to follow binding Supreme Court precedent.’
That caught our attention.
That’s basically judicial code-speak for ‘I think the Supreme Court has made a mistake in its prior rulings, but a lower court judge like me has no right to ignore their rulings.’ And that made us stop skimming and start over, reading it deeper.
And to our surprise, she is basically right. This is the fault of the Supreme Court. But she is bound to follow their rulings, even as she is pretty explicitly saying that the Supreme Court needs to fix the mess that they have created—or Congress needs to fix it for them. This is not a judicial insurrection where district courts seem to be increasingly defying the Supreme Court. This appears to be a judge following precedents set by the Supreme Court like she is supposed to, even though she personally disagrees with those precedents, while she makes her disagreement pretty clear. Bluntly, she is disagreeing with the Supreme Court the correct way—by very obviously urging them to change their mind while following their rulings in the meantime.
So, let’s start at the beginning. Before this ruling, Mangione was charged with four counts under federal law. This is how the opinion describes the charges:
Defendant Luigi Nicholas Mangione is charged in a four-count indictment with interstate travel for the purpose of stalking Brian Thompson, causing his death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1)(A) and 2261(b)(1) (Count One); use of electronic communication systems for the purpose of stalking Brian Thompson, causing his death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A) and 2261(b)(1) (Count Two); murder of Brian Thompson through use of a firearm during and in relation to the stalking crimes charged in Counts One and Two, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(j) (Count Three); and use of a firearm, which was brandished, discharged, and equipped with a silencer, during and in relation to the stalking crimes charged in Counts One and Two, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) and (c)(1)(B)(ii) (Count Four).
As you will recall, the first two counts only have a potential sentence of up to life in prison. But counts Three and Four have the possibility of the death penalty as a punishment. So lets look at them for a moment. The focus of both of those counts is 18 U.S.C. § 924 which is one that sets up certain penalties for certain crimes. In short, these two counts amount to sentencing enhancements, that bring this up to being a death penalty case. The court wisely takes the two out of order and we will do the same. Count Four cites §§924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), which collectively states the following:
(c)
(1)
(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(Emphasis added.) For the record, that is not a typo, where we have two lines where there is no text but a header. That’s how the statute actually looks. We swear a huge part of the reason lawyers earn the big bucks is that we can pick through messy stuff text like this and not lose our minds.
Moving on, let’s take a moment to break down that huge paragraph in subsection (c)(1)(A). First, it says:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, …
Let us translate: This part means that if another law gives a higher mandatory minimum sentence than this part, go with that.
…any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime…
We will get to what a ‘crime of violence’ is in a moment—it’s going to be really important—but note that the government is not even alleging that Mangione was committing a drug trafficking offense—so the drug trafficking language is irrelevant. But this passage is saying that this conduct has to take place as they are committing a different crime that is itself a crime of violence (or drug trafficking offense).
… (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device)…
Rather than translate it, we will simply say this parenthetical is irrelevant here.
… for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,…
They mean prosecuted in Federal Court.
…uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
We could go on, but Mangione allegedly did all three. He allegedly used the gun, carried the gun and possessed the gun. It is possible to do some of these without doing the others (and he only had to do one), but that’s not relevant here. If Mangione did what he is charged with, he definitely did all three. And then if all those conditions are met, then the sentence is enhanced according to those three subsections (i)-(iii). Obviously, Mangione is charged with actually discharging the firearm, so he gets the highest sentence enhancement.
So, understanding that, Count Four also references §924(c)(1)(B)(ii) which says:
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
…
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
(Emphasis added.) So where it talks about a violation of this subsection, that includes the language we just went over. So this is a further enhancement setting a mandatory minimum of 30 years, if the person used a silencer, as Mangione allegedly did.
Of course, that still doesn’t get us to the death penalty. For that, you need Count Three, which references § 924(j) which states in relevant part that:
(j) A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall—
(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life…
Now you see why the judge and this author talked about Count Four before Count Three. Because Count Three depends on a finding that Mangione violated Count Four.
So, if you violate subsection (c) (which is what Count Four is all about—allegations that Mangione violated that subsection), and it is a murder, then the death penalty is on the table. We won’t belabor whether Mangione’s alleged actions count as murder because it is very obvious that it does.
But in this case, all of that hinges on whether or not the gun was used, carried or possessed ‘during and in relation to any crime of violence.’ We told you that the definition of 'crime of violence' would be important soon, and now is that time. What are the alleged ‘crimes of violence’ that he committed while using a gun? Well, according to the federal prosecutors it was the first two counts. Just so you don’t have to scroll back, here’s how the court described those counts:
Defendant Luigi Nicholas Mangione is charged in a four-count indictment with interstate travel for the purpose of stalking Brian Thompson, causing his death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1)(A) and 2261(b)(1) (Count One); use of electronic communication systems for the purpose of stalking Brian Thompson, causing his death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A) and 2261(b)(1) (Count Two).
So, basically normal stalking and electronic stalking that culminated in Mangione allegedly murdering a man. And if it sounds absurd to even ask the question of whether or not this was a crime of violence, the judge agrees:
The Court would be remiss not to note at the outset the apparent absurdity of the inquiry. The Defendant is charged with selecting a stranger to be killed based on his employment; carefully planning the killing, including identifying where and when the selected victim would be most vulnerable; traveling across multiple states to carry out that killing; and then gunning the victim down on a public street in midtown Manhattan, using a handgun equipped with a silencer. No one could seriously question that this is violent criminal conduct.
So, if you think this should be a no-brainer, the court agrees. But the problem is that the Supreme Court has defined the term 'crime of violence' in a way that that ignores what Mangione actually did in this case. From the opinion:
And yet, over the course of the last two decades or so, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a legal journey, explained herein, that now requires lower courts to engage in an analysis totally divorced from the conduct at issue and centered on the hypothetically least serious conduct that the charged crime could possibly cover.
Allow us to explain what she is saying. Let’s take the first statute in the first count, regular stalking under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1)(A) as an example. It says:
Whoever—
(1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce or is present within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or enters or leaves Indian country, with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel or presence engages in conduct that—
(A) places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to—
(i) that person[.]
The statute goes on but we got through the relevant parts.
So Mangione allegedly satisfies the requirement that he ‘travels in interstate commerce’ by allegedly crossing multiple state lines to go after his victim. (Now you know why the left constantly harped on the claim that Kyle Rittenhouse crossed state lines, even if that statute doesn’t really apply to his conduct.)
Mangione allegedly had the ‘intent to kill … another person’—specifically Thompson.
We would guess that the prosecutor’s theory is that Mangione allegedly ‘place[d] that person [Thompson] in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to … that person’ because even though Thompson was ambushed, he was alive just long enough to feel that reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury … because he was in fact being murdered, which tends to have that emotional effect on people.
But what the Supreme Court has done is say that the courts have to look at what the statute says and determine whether or not it can be hypothetically committed without violence, attempted violence or a threat of violence. So, while Mangione obviously committed a crime of violence, the court has to look at whether every possible way to commit the crime involves violence, attempted violence, or the threat of violence. And part of the problem is what we call men rea, or the state of mind of the alleged perpetrator. You see, you don’t have to intentionally place a person in fear of death or serious bodily injury in order to satisfy the stalking statute—you can accomplish this recklessly (basically an extra boneheaded ‘accident'). But the Supreme Court has also said that if the statute can be satisfied by merely being merely reckless, then that is not a crime of violence. So, by binding Supreme Court precedent, that’s not a crime of violence.
And in reaching this conclusion, Judge Garnett excoriates the Supreme Court for forcing her down this route:
[The Supreme Court's rules have] produced questionable results that defy common sense, see, e.g. United States v. Lung’aho, 72 F. 4th 845, 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2023) (arson is not a ‘crime of violence’ under Section 924(c))2; United States v. Walker, 934 F. 3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (kidnapping is not a ‘crime of violence’), and, equally importantly, has proven increasingly difficult for lower courts to apply with any confidence or consistency. These are not new observations. See, e.g. United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 863–72 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (decrying the current state of the Supreme Court’s categorical approach jurisprudence and urging a revival of the residual clause or a return to a constitutionally-permitted conduct-based analysis).
She is saying about as clearly as one can that the Supreme Court should reverse itself. When she says the current rule is hard to apply with confidence or consistency, she is saying it is unworkable, which is a classic justification cited by the Supreme Court when it overturns itself—not to mention that this Biden appointee is saying basically ‘we should do what Clarence Thomas suggested.’ How often do Biden appointees they say anything like that?
But while she was sending a very clearly coded signal to the Supreme Court to overturn itself, Congress could also intervene, to a degree. Congress could pass a law clearing this issue up and effectively ‘do what Clarence Thomas suggested.’ But the problem in this particular case is that any such new law couldn’t be applied retroactively under the Constitution’s ex post facto clause. The effect of that clause is that criminal statutes can only be forward-looking. In other words, even if they passed this law tomorrow (fat chance), Mangione still wouldn’t face the death penalty. But at least going forward, the next Mangione would be eligible for the death penalty—and sadly, we are concerned that he will have imitators, whatever his punishment ends up being.
So, the best solution is for the Supreme Court to overturn itself.
The second best solution is for Congress to pass a new law effectively overturning the Supreme Court.
We shall see if either one of those events occur.
And, finally, can the Blue States just stop pretending to be morally superior on the death penalty? We wouldn’t have to do any of this if the state of New York had the death penalty like a civilized state, providing true justice for this most heinous crime. These Blue Staters claim that they don’t want anyone executed, but state officials are all too happy to let the Feds execute many of the worst of the worst criminals. It is a classic example of having your cake and eating it, too. The people of Massachusetts get to preen and pretend they are morally superior because they wouldn’t even kill the Boston Marathon bomber … even though twelve random, ordinary citizens of Massachusetts sentenced him to death. Stop being hypocrites and bring back true justice: Bring back the death penalty.
RELATED: LAWSPLAINING: Detransitioner Wins $2 Million Judgement Against Psychologist and Surgeon
WATCH: Stephen Colbert Claims That the Nazis Were Better Than ICE
BREAKING: An NYT Interview With Biden Just Undermined Thousands of His Late Pardons (A Deep Dive)